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'  A  EUROPEAN  PERSPECTIVE  ON  AGRICULTURAL  TKADE  , 
First, let me  thank you  for  giving me  this 
opportunity to say  a  few  words  about agricultural 
trade as  seen  from  the other side of the Atlantic. 
; 
My  job as agricultural attache is beginning to take 
me  around your  country  and  I  cannot  see that  I  will 
ever  become  accustomed  to its enormous  size.  The 
distance_  from Washington to  Kansas  City is about 
950  miles.  If I  had traveled that distance  from  my 
previous office in Brussels,  I  would  have  found  my-
self in Riga in Latvia,  in:-.Minsk  in the Soviet Union 
or,  in order to stay within our  EC,  somewhere  south 
of Naples  in the toe of Italy. 
But to trade matters.  That this is  a  question 
of paramount  importance m US/EC  relations,  is illustrated 
first by  the  fact that something like one fifth of American 
industrial production is exported  and  nearly  4  out of every 
5  manufacturing  jobs  created in the  US  between  1977  and 
1980  were  linked  to exports,  and  second,  the  EC  is the 
US's  largest single market.  Together  the  US  and  EC 
account  for  one  third of all world trade.  Nearly  hal~, 
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if you  count trade beb1een  the  10  Hember  states of 
the  EC. 
Being  the worlds  largest trading  p~rtners, 
we  both have  a  vested interest in seeing t1 it, that 
the open world trading  system promoted  and,protected 
by  GATT  and  which has  provided the  framework  for  a  un-
precedented increase in prosperity over  th~ last 35 
years,  should not be put at risk. 
One  of the  factors  which could put the  system 
under  serious pressure is the friction between  us  on 
agricultural trade,  particularly when  there are  so 
few  signs  - if any  - of growth  in export markets  for 
farm  produce. 
Here,  on this side of the Atlantic,  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy is frequently  seen  as  being the 
major  cause  for  these difficulties.  So,  perhaps, it 
would  be  useful if I  \17ere  to  say  a  fe\v  \ITOrds  about it 
and  then move  on  to  the  specific areas of friction. 
Why,  you  may  ask,  bother to have  a  CAP  at all? 
Why  not let the  free market work  - assuming  for  the 
moment  that  somewhere  in the world there is such  a 
thing as  a  free,  unfettered market  for agricultural 
products.  The  answer  lies in  the history of our 
Community. - 3  -
When  the  EC  was  created in 1957  by  the  6 
original Member  States, it was  based  on  a  political 
deal whereby  trade was  opened  up  between  i~s members. 
I 
This  could be  achieved  for  industrial  good~ by  elimi-
1 
nating custom tariffs but this would  have  made  little 
sense  for agricultural products  because of the 
widely different agricultural structures in  tho~six 
Member  States and  the different forms  of  farm  support 
used.  The  only solution was  to harmonize  these 
different national  systems  into  a  Common  European 
policy.  Thus1the  CAP  became  a  vital element  in the 
process of European  integration  - a  process which 
continues  and  a  process which we,  who  have  the privi-
lege of serving in the  European  Commission,  have  the 
duty to nurture. 
The  objectives of this policy  - and  which differ 
very little from  those of  US  farm  policy  - are spelt out 
in Article  39  of the Treaty  - the Treaty of  Rome  - which 
established the  Community.  These  are: 
increase productivity 
secure  a  fair standar4  of living for  the 
farm  population 
- achieve market stability 
- to assure availability of supplies 
to provide reasonable  consumer prices. ------------------------------------------------
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The  mysterious ways  by  which  these objectives 
are attained will be  familiar  to  some  of you  but less 
so  to others.  Very briefly,  they  include  ~ uniform or 
common  internal price level with variable  ~evies on 
I 
imports  below this price and  refunds  on  ex~orts when 
the internal price is above  the world market.  These 
mechanisms  have  helped to largely iron out.sharp 
fluctuations  on our internal market.  Prices  have  been 
stabilised - generally at higher levels than those 
obtained in the  US.  But  assurance of supply  - like 
any  insurance policy  - involves  paying  a  premium. 
'The  CAP  has  also helped to achieve  sharp in-
creases in productivity and  we  have  witnessed the 
farm  labour  force decline  from  18  million to less than 
9  million.  Over  the  same  period,  the average  farm  size 
has  doubled to about  45  acres.  Farm  incomes  have  been 
maintained at a  reasonable level but  I  am  certain that 
our  farmers  would  be  the first to point out that their 
real  incomes  actually fell in 1979,  1980  & 1981. 
The  CAP  has also enabled the  EC  to reach self 
sufficiency in a  number  of essential goodstuffs.  Thus, 
assured supplies  and price stability have  been  achieved 
both are,  of course,  objectives of the  CAP  as  spelt out 
in the Treaty  and  both are of primary  concern to our 
consumers.  Security,  in the minds  of many  Europeans, - 5  -
often has  as  much  to do  with  guaranteed  food  supply as 
it has  with missiles and  nuclear war  heads. 
In  some  cases,  self sufficiency has  been  exceeded 
and it is in these areas where  the problems  between  the 
two  sides have  developed. 
The  discussions between  US  and  EC  officials,  the 
next  round  of which will take place in Washington  on 
22/23,  have  enabled the  two  sides to clearly identify 
these friction areas  - they are relatively few  in 
numbers  and  are:  wheat,  wheat flour,  poultry and dairy 
products.  They  have also helped  - equally importantly -
to establish that our  import arrangements  for agricultural 
products  - as  opposed  to their export  - are not  a  divisive 
or serious  issue between us.  These  import arrangements  -
whatever  may  be  put about  elsewhere  - are  amongst  the 
most  liberal in the western world.  Proof of this is to 
be  found  in the fact that,  in spite of our having reached 
and,in  some  cases,exceeded self sufficiency in  a  number  of 
products,  the  EC  is the largest importer of agricultural 
goods  in the world  - about  one quarter of global agricul-
tural trade is discharged  in European ports,  and,  what 
is more  important to  an  audience  in the heartland of 
the  US,  we  are  the~American farmer's  best customer.  In 
1981  we  bought  9.0 billion $  worth  of  US  agricultural 
produce  - including 2.8 billion  $  of  soyabeans  - and 
ran  a  massive  trade deficit on transatlantic agricul-
tural trade of around  7.0 billion $.  Thus,  our  import - 6  -
arrangements  are not an  issue.  The  trade figures  I 
have  just cited underscore the point  I  made  at the be-
ginning about  the  paramount  importance of  US/EC  commer-
cial ties. 
So  let us  examine  the circumstances  surrounding 
the  Community's  transformation  from  a  net importer  to 
a  net exporter of  some  agricultural products.  This 
has  come  about  largely as  a  result of  a  revolution in 
productivity which has  taken place in the  Community 
since the  inception of the  CAP.  Just as  productivity 
has  increased in the  US  so it has  - even  more  so  - in the 
EC.  Grain yields,  for  example,  have  doubled  over the 
last 20  years,  because of better seeds  varieties and 
cultivation techniques etc.  In fact,  wheat yields of 
5  tons  per hectare are far  from  unusual  in Europe  (a 
hectaree is almost  2  1/2 acres).  The  result of this 
has  been that over the past decade,  Community  wheat 
production  - as  opposed  to productivity - has  risen 
by  29  %,  compared with an  average world  increase of  27  %. 
Since  we  are frequently  accused of artificially stimu-
lating production in the Community  by  fixing generous 
support prices, it is illuminating to compare  this  29  % 
increase with what  has  happened  in the us.  The  first - 7  -
thing one notices is that whereas  the EC's  increase has 
taken place on  a  relatively static acreage  - there is 
after all not much  spare  land available in Europe  - that 
in the us  has  taken place on  a  markedly  increased acreage 
it has  also largely taken place in soft wheats.  As  to 
total  US  wheat  production this has  gone  up  by  73  % 
compared with  29  % in the  Community  and  27  % over the 
world  as  a  whole.  Since total wheat  production in both 
the  EC  and  the  US  exceeds  internal needs  - two  thirds of 
US  wheat is surplus  to requirements  - some  of the excess 
finds it way  on  to  the world market.  And  it is this 
massive  increase in US  production which has  been  one of 
the most  important destabilising factors  on  the world 
wheat market.  But  before  I  look at the  way  in which 
exports  have  developed,  let me  say  a  word  or  two  about 
our export refunds  - or subsidies  as  the  GATT  terms  them. 
GATT  rules permit export subsidies on agricultural pro-
ducts  provided  they  do  not result in a  contracting party 
gaining more  than  an  equitable market  share.  We  feel  we 
have  observed this rule.  Figures  exchanged  by  the  two 
sides in the bilateral discussions  show,  that in the 
case of wheat  the  EC  share of the world market over  the 
last decade  has  grown  from  5  % to  10  %.  The  US  pushed 
its share of the world market  much  more  strongly from 
33  % to  51  %.  I  submit that it would  be difficult on 
the basis of these percentages  to  sustain the  argument 
that the  Community  had  been taking  some  of the  US  share. - 8  -
At  a  gathering  such as this  I  cannot,  of course, 
overlook  flour,  so let us  examine  wheat  and  wheat  flour 
together  - a  more  realistic exercise than that of con-
fining our  studies to wheat or flour  separately,  since, 
if you  export wheat  as  flour,  you  cannot expect to export 
i~ as  grain as well.  Over  the  same  decade,  that we 
took  for wheat  on its own,  that is to say  for  the period 
71/72  to  81/82,  the  Community  increased its share of 
the world market  for wheat  and wheat  flour  from  9  % to 
14  %,  whereas  the  US  share  grew  from  32  % to  49  %. 
Generally speaking,  the worlds  wheat  flour market 
has  stagnated over  the last couple of years.  This  is 
not entirely surprising when  one observes  the world re-
cession coupled with  a  trend  for developing countries 
to set up  their own  flour milling plants  and  to import 
wheat  instaed of flour.  However,  it does  seem  to me 
that the only potential area  for any  sustained growth  in 
exports of wheat  and/or  flour is in these developing 
countries. 
But  coming  back to the discussions with our  US 
colleagues on wheat  and  wheat  flour.  The  US's  dramatic 
increase in production,  the resultant increased dependence 
of the  US  wheat  farmer  on  a  notoriously unreliable world 
market are  two  striking elements that have  emerged with 
great alarity.  Nevertheless,  we  in the  Community  are 
prepared to make  a  real and  considerable effort to ease 
the situation by  building up  our wheat  stocks to unpre-
cedented levels.  This effort, if not nullified by other - 9  -
exporters,  should help to  improve  the situation on 
the world wheat market. 
The  other  two  problem areas are poultry and  dairy 
products.  Our  discussions  on  poultry and careful  , : 
examination of the trade figures  has  shown  that,  yes, 
the  US  has  lost  some  of its world market  share recently, 
but then  so  has  the  EC.  Further examination reveals 
that our  combined  loss  has  been  the  gain of  a  compara-
tive newcomer  to the world  poultry scene  - Brazil,  whose 
exports,  helped  by  low prices and  generous  credit terms, 
have  increased to  the extent that they  now  have  20  % 
of the world  market  compared with virtually "o"  five 
years  ago.  It is clear that we  need,  in the case of 
poultry,  to convert our bilaterals into trilaterals and 
to  include Brazil. 
Dairy  products,  in my  view,  present the biggest 
potential dangers  and  problems.  Some  of you  may  have 
read of the advances  made  in genetic engineering and 
other aareas with the result that  some  herds of  super 
cows  in the  US  have  started producing  55,000  lbs.  of milk 
per year  - this is about  3  times  what is achieved at 
present in Europe  by  our most  successful herds.  At  the 
same  time  I  have  seen  forecasts  that the  ~rlds most 
important export outlet for dairy products  - the Soviet 
Union  - should be able to build  up  their domestic  pro-
duction to the extent that by  1990  they will no  longer - 10  -
need  to  import.  I  shall believe that when  I  see it 
but,nevertheless,  it is an  indication and  warning  to 
us  all.  Stocks  in the us  and  the  EC  are already at 
massive  levels  (last year the  US  government  bought 
three quarters of all dried milk  produced) land,  unless 
I 
both sides get to grips with this rapidly  ~orsening 
situation,  the  problems  we  have  seen with grains will 
seem relatively minor.  Both  sides must  agree to take 
measures  - the  US  and  EC  must  each  take their own  - which 
will adapt milk production to market  needs  and  thus 
reduce present budgetary costs. 
These  then are the  four  major  areas of  friction 
and  I  hope  that next week's  talks will  see us  achieve 
some  accommodation.  You  may  have  gathered  from what 
I  have  said that the sorts of accommodation  that may 
emerge  do  not  involve  a  renegotiation or  a  dismantling 
of the  CAP.  This is so.  We  are  seeking solutions to our 
problems within existing systems  and  the  EC  for its part 
has  no  intention of abandoning or bargaining  away  the 
principles of the  CAP.  For one  thing,  the  CAP  is an 
essential element in European  integration and,  for  another, 
it has little to  do with the problems  - serious as  they 
are  - facing American  farmers.  These difficulties are 
due  to other,  far more  telling factors. - 11  -
I  have  listed these  factors  on  previous occasions, 
but  I  make  no  excuse  for  doing  so,  yet,  again.  Some  have 
been outside your control  - world recession and  crippling 
debt  problems  in important client  countries~  Mexico,  for 
I 
example,  reduced its grain purchases  from  the  US  from  6  mio 
tons  in 1981  to  2  mio  tons  in 1982. 
Others  - if I  dare  say this  so  far  from  home  -
are to  a  large extent of your  own  making  - the increase in 
the total cultivated land during the  70's  by  60  million 
acres  (I  have  already referred to the dramatic  increase in 
wheat  acreages.).  This  expansion was  continuing even  in 
the  late.seventies,when economic  conditions were deterio-
rating sharply. 
This,  of course,  led to  huge  increases  in produc-
tion.  Between  1975  and  1981,  US  production of wheat  in-
creased  from  58  mio  tons  to  76  mio  tons, 
soya  from  41  mio  tons  to  56  mio  tons, 
corn  from  146  mio  tons  to  208  mio  and milk 
from  115  billion lbs to  128  billion lbs. 
As  was  the case with wheat,  the world market,  un-
able  to absorb  such  surges,  was  seriously disrupted. 
There  has,  of course,  in addition been  a  strong 
dollar and  last,  but by  no  means  least,  in this light, 
which  is far  from  exhaustive,  was  your  government's  de-
cision,to  impose  a  grain  embargo  on  the Soviet Union. - 12  -
(We  all await  news  from next week's  talks on  a  LTA  with 
great interst.) 
Thus,  whilst clearly the  EC  and  its CAP  has  an 
I 
influence on world markets  as  do all exporters,  large 
and  small,  we  insist that the real causes  oJ  the diffi-
culties of American  farmers  lie a  lot closer than  Europe. 
Nevertheless,  the  CAP  is not set in concrete, 
it can  and  does  evolve  and  steps  have  been  taken to 
ensure  a  better matching of supply  and  demand,  to make 
producers  bear the burden of overproduction,  to adapt 
to our role as  a  permanent exporter of  some  products  and 
to restore  sound operation to our agricultural markets. 
The  recent price decisions  taken  in Brussels  -
in the  face of strong political pressure  - are  some  of 
the first steps along this road.  Price increases were 
extremely prudent overall  - the  lowest in a  decade or 
more  - and  in the case of crops,  where  production had 
exceeded predetermined thresholds,  penalties were  in-
flicted on  producers.  Ministers not only accepted the 
principle of,  what we  call,  producer co-responsibility, 
but they  saw to it that this principle was  implemented 
where it hurts.  These  are proofs that the  CAP  is not 
immutable,  but is established and adaptable  and  good 
for  many  more  years,  yet.  It is a  policy for people 
not cows  - and  what  is more,  for people whose  ancestors 
have  farmed  in Europe  for  2000  years.  From this you 
may  gather,  that it has  an  immensely  important social 
function  as well  as  an  economic  one. - 13  -
I  trust,  Chairman,  that these recent adaptions 
to the  CAP,  the  changes  of direction and  emphasis,  and 
some  development of the progress  we  have  mad!e  so  far  in 
our talks with our  American  colleagues will 'enable  us 
I  to defuse  the problems  which,  as  I  said at the outset, 
could put at risk the trading  system  - and  more  - which 
has  served friends  and allies together so well over the 
last  30  years. 